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New Public Management between reality and illusion:  






Drawing from the theoretical insights of pragmatic constructivism, this paper aims to explain the 
difficulties faced by organizational actors in the translation of performance-based budgeting (PBB) 
into practice. The dichotomy of reality and illusion at the centre of pragmatic constructivism sheds 
light on the limitations and shortcomings that characterize the implementation of a business-like 
practice introduced as a component of the reform movement known as New Public Management 
(NPM). The paper investigates the case of an Italian Ministry through the analysis of interviews, policy 
documents, and governmental reports. The analysis shows that a failed integration of communication, 
values and aims between actors and an illusionary analysis of factual possibilities constrain the 
construction of causalities, hence jeopardizing the successful implementation of the performance-
based budgeting reform. Rather than engaging in a co-authoring process, the actors are left with 
illusionary constructs that, while providing the appearance of a compliant organization, fail to produce 







The present research adopts a pragmatic constructivist approach to understand and explain the 
validity of a managerial reform, performance-based budgeting (PBB), in the public sector. In particular, 
the study focuses on the challenges faced by organizational actors in the process of implementing the 
reform, meeting initial expectations and offering visible and tangible results.  
PBB is one of the labels whereby mechanisms and procedures designed to use performance 
information during the budgeting process have become widespread (OECD, 2007; Robinson, 2007). 
Despite not being new, PBB has gained renewed attention as a component of the broad reform 
movement known under the umbrella term of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Hyndman 
et al., 2014). Indeed, the focus on measuring and managing performance that drives PBB is at the 
heart of the NPM movement. The main rationale beyond this reform movement lies in the assumption 
that private sector management frameworks and practices can be used (Stiglitz, 1989) to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. Therefore, since the 1980s, the public sector has 
undertaken waves of reforms, inspired by private sector management practice, to improve its 
performance. 
The feasibility and usefulness of this approach has been the object of great scrutiny and debate. 
Indeed, NPM has been criticized because of its poor implementation and difficulties in meeting the 
initial expectations (Lapsley, 2008; Lynn, 1998). Scholars have critically underlined how a managerial 
approach in the public sector can lead to controversial results, such as the diffusion of an 
entrepreneurial ethos (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014) that transforms the public servant 
in a new homo economicus (Hoskin, 2015), the risk of privatizing moral concerns (Dobel, 1978), 
penalizing the public sphere (Lehman, 2010), and the common understanding of public interest 
(Johnston, 2015). In contrast, other prior studies have noted that although the inevitable paradoxes 
linked to a new reform movement, such as NPM, do exist, it is still worth the effort (Dan & Pollitt, 
2014; Hood & Peters, 2004) and, indeed, it still plays an influencing role in the current public sector 
agenda (de Vries & Nemec, 2013). Accordingly, the practices introduced as a part of NPM have been 
the object of a lively debate about their challenges and potentialities, which is reflected in the body 
of knowledge on PBB.  
However, studies on the topic have emphasized the structural reasons for failure at the expense of 
the micro conditions that can transform a managerial practice, such as PBB, into a successful practice. 
To overcome the limitations of this overly structure-based approach (Ashraf & Uddin, 2016), the 
research objectives are to understand and explain the implementation of a managerial practice as PBB 
in the public context by relying on the methodological and theoretical insights of the pragmatic 
constructivist approach (Nørreklit, 2011). With its focus on both social structures and agency, 
pragmatic constructivism offers methodological guidance for the collection of data as well as 
theoretical constructs that are useful for the interpretation of findings. In accordance with the 
pragmatic constructivism methodology, we try to gain insights into the structural dimensions of the 
reform exploring at the same time the actors’ response to the changes to be implemented. We could 
thus argue that the reasons why this reform did not materialize in an Italian ministry lie in the 
structural features of the public sector organization, in the reform’s key components and expectations 
and in the actors’ experience of reality (facts, values, possibilities and communication) when 
constructing the pragmatic truth.  
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In terms of the theoretical analysis of the findings, we rely on the main concepts of pragmatic 
constructivism, such as co-authorship, proactive and pragmatic truth, to code and analyse the data. 
In so doing, the research contributes to the understanding of PBB validity from a new perspective, 
focusing on organizational actors and on the conditions of integration between the four dimensions 
of how actors experience reality (facts, values, possibilities and communication) in the process of 
constructing the pragmatic truth. By using this approach, this research aims also to enrich the 
epistemology of pragmatic constructivism. In particular, our paper extends pragmatic constructivism 
by offering a theoretical model suitable for explaining the types of issues faced by actors in the process 
of translating the aspirations of a reform such as PBB into a functioning reality. Hence, the research 
contributes to the current understanding of NPM and PBB challenges by investigating the interactions 
between diverse factors linked to both reforms and actors. We believe that explaining the failures in 
meeting initial expectations may offer normative guidance for the transformation of the reform into 
a successful practice. Thus, pragmatic constructivism offers not only valuable methodological and 
theoretical insights but also provides normative guidance for a successful implementation of practices.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next paragraph reviews the main issues on NPM and PBB by 
analysing relevant literature on the topic. The subsequent section explains the theoretical framework 
adopted to analyse the practice of PBB and the fourth section illustrates the research method. The 
fifth and sixth sections, respectively, describe and discuss its adoption and implementation at the 
central level of government in Italy through the lens of pragmatic constructivism. Finally, the last two 
sections summarize the key findings and draw the conclusions of the research, underling its 
implications and contributions. 
 
2. NPM and PBB: issues and challenges from a micro-perspective 
 
The practice of PBB provides a significant example of a reform whose adoption and implementation 
in the public sector have gained new life with the advent of NPM, but whose lengthy history has been 
characterized by high expectations and frequent disappointments, often failing in meeting the 
expected outcomes (Bogt, 2008; Jackson, 2011). 
In general, despite the difficulties in measuring the impact of NPM reforms, the empirical evidence 
has often revealed less than satisfactory results regarding managerial practices in the public sector. 
Indeed, the translation of private tools and practices in the public sector has often failed in producing 
the expected initial outcomes, while resulting in unintentional, and sometimes regressive, outcomes 
(Ashraf & Uddin, 2016; Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Hood & Peters, 2004; Tambulasi, 
2009).  
NPM reforms have frequently been considered illusionary since their results have not met the 
expectations of policy makers and/or stakeholders. On the one hand, some critiques have contested 
the unsuitability of NPM principles for the public sector as a reason for its reforms’ negative results. 
On the other hand, critiques have centred on the challenges that have occurred in the process of 
reform implementation. These relate to the limitations and structural features of the public sector 
context, which have resulted in a poor implementation of reforms. Hence, empirical studies have 
noted the tensions between the different values derived from the introduction of NPM reforms 
(Kartalis, Tsamenyi, & Jayasinghe, 2016), where an excessive focus on results and business-related 
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values may undermine the commitment to key public values (Broadbent, Jacobs, & Laughlin, 2001; 
Lorenz, 2012; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002), and generate counter-productive effects (Tambulasi, 
2009). However, tensions can emerge between NPM tools, normative expectations, and public sector 
organizations’ structural features. Hence, the failure in meeting the initial expectations can be due to 
the lack of fit between the original design of a reform and the specific context in which it has been 
used. This failure is evident, for instance, in the limited use of abundant performance information 
produced in the spirit of NPM (Sterck, 2007) or in the unexpected impact of reforms resulting from 
their increase in administrative controls rather than an improvement in governance (Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2001). A wide range of possible reasons for the partial and poor implementation of NPM 
reforms have been identified, including state incapacity (Sarker, 2006), little political support and lack 
of debate on reforms (Russell, Bennett, & Mills, 1999), lack of functional selection and designing of 
the reforms (Bogt, Helden, & Kolk, 2015), and limited technical competences and professional 
authority (Lorenz, 2012). Table 1 at the end of this section reports and summarizes some of the main 
contributions to the critical debate on NPM. From this, the failures of the reforms are evident in their 
self-defeating results or, to a lesser extent, in the gap between the reforms’ expectations and results. 
These types of studies have neglected the integration and interaction of different perspectives (reform 
features; public sector features; organizational actors’ role) in analysing and explaining the 
(un)successful implementation of an NPM reform.  
Among the NPM initiatives, over the years, the practice of PBB has been adopted worldwide under 
multiple labels, at different tiers of government and with diverse extents of development. The 
common element of its different potential forms lies in the adoption of a results-approach to both 
management and budgeting (Curristine, 2005; Kristensen, Groszyk, & Bühler, 2002) with a strong 
emphasis on output controls, accountability for results, and rationalism emphasized by NPM 
(Gruening, 2001; Hood, 1991).  
Indeed, the formulation of the PBB reform has been accompanied by a set of rational expectations 
concerning its desired outcomes. Specifically, PBB is expected to produce and use performance 
information to guide the budgeting process and influence the allocation of resources, directly or 
indirectly, to manage the efficiency and effectiveness of governments and their agencies, improve 
budgetary decision-making and allocation of resources, achieve cost savings, and reinforce 
transparency and accountability (Curristine, 2005). However, the empirical evidence has proven that 
it is challenging to achieve these diverse objectives simultaneously (Arellano-Gault & Gil-Garcia, 2004) 
and that the rational expectations about production and use of comprehensive performance 
information in the budgeting process do not often become the reality (Raudla, 2012; Sterck, 2007). 
“Each advantage or benefit of PBB seems to introduce at least one new risk or threat to data integrity” 
(Smith, 1999, p. 4). These threats can be common to all public budgeting reforms or can be unique to 
PBB, which highlights the reason why PBB failures can relate to specific features and expectations of 
this reform as well as relate to other more general problems with public sector reform.  
The current body of knowledge on PBB is characterized by a wide set of studies investigating the 
challenges raised by this organizational practice and the factors required to overcome obstacles and 
produce successful results. Only a few studies have measured its impacts in terms, for instance, of 
cost savings and public expenditure management, as a recent review of the literature on the topic 
shows (Mauro, Cinquini, & Grossi, 2017). Scholars have designed frameworks of factors determining 
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the practice success or failure (Andrews, 2004; Grizzle & Pettijohn, 2002) where the factors influencing 
the practice have been derived from general principles set against the (indirect) analysis of 
experiences (e.g., Kong, 2005; McGill, 2001; McNab & Melese, 2003; Smith, 1999; VanLandingham, 
Wellman, & Andrews, 2005). Further, a significant body of knowledge on PBB has contributed by 
shedding light on the obstacles to its implementation by conducting surveys and collecting opinions 
about the general state-of-the-art processes (Jordan & Hackbart, 2005; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; 
Wang, 1999).  
In this regard, the main difficulties in implementing PBB concern the agreement on objectives and 
priorities and then the identification of proper performance measures to capture relevant and 
interesting issues (Curristine, 2005; Joyce, 1993; Moynihan, 2008; Wang 1999), showing that the 
difficulties with PBB are significantly derived from the difficulties in measuring performance because 
of the logic of the performance measurement and the reactivity to the measurement (Rebora, Ruffini, 
& Turri, 2017). Additional technical difficulties include the necessity of realizing significant investments 
in information and accounting systems to guarantee sound information (McNab & Melese, 2003), the 
need to make the reform sustainable over time (Curristine, 2005; Kong, 2005), and coordinating PBB 
with other tools, such as accrual accounting (Martì, 2013). In addition to these difficulties, the public 
sector’s features, such as the existence of uncontrollable spending and the political influence on 
budgeting (Pitsvada & LoStracco, 2002), challenge the success of the managerial reform. 
An additional challenging set of factors influencing the success of PBB includes the human dimension 
of the practice, which underlines the importance of building a performance culture, with the 
involvement and support of multiple actors through a good system of coordination and 
communication (Curristine, 2005; Kong, 2005; Lu, 2011; Wang, 1999). Indeed, such human factors 
contribute to explaining the intensity of the budgetary use of performance information (Grossi, 
Reichard, & Ruggiero, 2016). Conversely, analyses have been conducted on the impact of PBB (or lack 
of) on behaviour of actors (Andrews & Hills, 2003) and the factors influencing the managers’ 
perceptions of PBB success (Helmuth, 2010). 
From this perspective, few studies have assumed the point of view of the actors to investigate which 
specific challenges they experience in implementing PBB. To compare PBB in multiple countries, Sterck 
and Scheers (2006) conducted a multiple case study, in which they interviewed experts and 
investigated, among many other factors, their perceived challenges. Flowers, Kundin, and Brower 
(1999) investigated the conditions enabling or challenging PBB implementation in two specific cases, 
focusing on how state agency administrators influence and are influenced by institutional and 
environmental conditions in implementing the practice. Raudla (2012) focused on the use of 
performance information by legislators, identifying the challenges to such use. This study aims to 
contribute to this debate by assuming a micro-perspective to analyse the challenges faced by 
organizational actors in implementing PBB. This study is focused on providing a comprehensive 
explanation of the integration of different factors linked to the actors’ needs and possibilities, the 
reform’s expectations, and the contrasting values analysed through the lens of pragmatic 
constructivism. 
 
Table 1. Research on NPM: some key issues 
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3. A pragmatic constructivism approach to NPM reforms and PBB 
 
This study draws on the theoretical insights of pragmatic constructivism, which recognizes the 
prominent role of organizational actors in the development of successful practices and provides an 
analytical lens to explain how actors construct reality in organizational and dynamic contexts 
(Nørreklit, 2017). The underlying assumption is that specific organizational settings allow the 
individuals to become actors, i.e., authors of their own actions and holders of responsibility, by 
strengthening the actors’ ability to transform action possibilities into reality (Jakobsen, Johanson, & 
Nørreklit, 2011). From this standpoint, the research is designed to improve the understanding of PBB, 
as a specific example of NPM reforms, by adopting an actor-based approach that investigates how 
organizational actors construct the practice of PBB and what types of challenges they face in this 
process (Nørreklit, 2011). 
Pragmatic constructivism takes a realistic standpoint by developing a pragmatic epistemology that 
claims a trustworthy understanding of reality. Its conceptualization of the reality-illusion dichotomy 
(Nørreklit, 2011) serves as a crucial concept that sheds lights on the way in which actors construct 
successful practices or fail in this attempt. The distinction between reality and illusion is indeed 
pragmatic, meaning that a construct is real, rather than illusionary, only if it produces the expected 
outcomes. 
In this regard, pragmatic constructivism formulates the following two notions of truth: proactive truth 
and pragmatic truth. Proactive truth refers to the correspondence (“a true representation signifies a 
feature of the world”, Nørreklit, 2017, p. 78) and coherence (“a true representation coheres with other 
accepted representations”) of a claim. The concept of proactive truth adheres to the principles of a 
philosophical tradition originating with Plato that conceives the concept of truth in terms of 
representation (Seal & Mattimoe, 2016), i.e., truth entails an idea of authenticity. In contrast, illusion 
has to do with deceptiveness, falsification and invalidity. A claim “is pragmatically true if the 
expectations it generates in relation to future observations become fulfilled” (Nørreklit, 2017, p. 79). 
Proactive truth refers to a construction process where the following two variables play a crucial role: 
the variable of time and the role played by the actors in the construction process. The evaluation of 
whether a claim is pragmatically true can be linguistically translated into the following question: did it 
work? (Nørreklit, 2017). A negative answer to this question is a signal of an illusionary construct. 
Indeed, when actions are based on illusion they are unlikely to succeed, while reality usually results in 
a functioning actor-world relationship (Nørreklit, 2011). A dialectic exists between proactive truth and 
pragmatic truth (Seal & Mattimoe, 2016), a dialectic that produces an a-posteriori learning process 
termed the “pragmatics of truth” (Nørreklit, Nørreklit, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 197; Seal & Mattimoe, 
2016). This process consists of the formulation of claims that need to be tested against reality 
(proactive truth) so that their practical validity can be assessed (pragmatic truth). The time dimension 
is a constitutive element of this process, as it is over time that the organizational actors can compare 
proactive truth claims with actual outcomes to test the validity of their expectations and plans (Seal 
& Mattimoe, 2016) (see Fig. 1). 
Thus, pragmatic constructivism recognizes the role of social construction in the production of truth, 
but it anchors this construction to the realist hypothesis of truth as a representational practice.  
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Figure 1. Reality vs. Illusion in pragmatic constructivism 
 
The notion of pro-active truth has been vital in legitimizing the accounting profession and the validity 
of the practice (Nørreklit, Nørreklit, & Mitchell, 2010). In opposition to emerging post-modern 
approaches (Macintosh, 2009), pragmatic constructivism claims that it is precisely the correspondence 
between the accounting facts and reality that ultimately ensures the validity of our social constructs 
(Nørreklit et al., 2010), which distinguishes, for instance, between fraudulent and legitimate practices. 
Similarly, it has been claimed that NPM lacks concern with proactive truth, as it has an indifference 
regarding the current states (Lorenz, 2012).  
The failures of NPM reforms reported in the previous section can, therefore, be understood in terms 
of an inability to truly represent the contextual factors that could have determined the failure and 
success of the reform. This lack of fit between the original design and the conditions for success of the 
reforms (i.e., lack of proactive-truth) has been revealed, for instance, by the limited use of abundant 
performance information produced in NPM development (Sterck, 2007). Furthermore, the debate 
around NPM- inspired reforms has been around the pragmatic-truth dimension as well. The reforms 
have been analysed in terms of a gap between expectations and desired outcomes. NPM reforms have 
been considered illusionary since their results have not met expectations, as shown by the empirical 
evidence on the less than satisfactory results of new private sector managerial practices in the public 
sector (Ashraf & Uddin, 2016; Dunleavy et al., 2006; Hood & Peters, 2004; Tambulasi, 2009). 
Additionally, Christensen and Laegreid (2001) argued that the reforms resulted in an increase in 
administrative controls rather than in an improvement in governance. Hence, the validity of the 
reforms has been questioned due to the gap between reforms’ expectations and outcomes and the 
mismatch between the reforms’ claims and contextual factors.  
The integration and interaction of two perspectives on the NPM area have been neglected. The first 
perspective focuses on the pragmatic truth of the reform (i.e., the mismatch between expectations 
and actual results). The second is the lack of correspondence between the design of the reform and 
the context that would have shaped, constrained or enabled the achievement of the reform (proactive 
truth). This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on the dialectics between these dimensions, 
that is the learning truth cycle, which sees the actors as protagonists.  
From a pragmatic constructivism perspective, this paper defines PBB as an organizational practice 
whose success depends on the possibility of organizational individuals to become actors, i.e., to build 
a set of construct causalities on their work world by integrating four dimensions, namely facts, values, 
possibilities and communication. To construct causalities and develop successful practices, the actors 
continuously modify and adjust their personal relations with the world and with other actors. In this 
respect, pragmatic constructivism uses the term topos to indicate “concepts used and common 
interpretations of the relevant concerns and arguments” (Nørreklit, Nørreklit, & Israelsen, 2006). A 
topos entails visions of the world and leads to the elaboration of alternative possibilities of action. 
Thus, a topos embeds values, defines alternative possibilities –factual and nonfactual- and requires 
the communication between actors to be shared and enacted. The actors use their own topoi to 
elaborate strategies of action and construct causalities. For this process to be successful, “the conduct 
of the authoring process should balance contributions from participating actors” (Nørreklit, 2017, p. 
28) leading to an orchestrated authorship where the organizational individuals are not only actors but 
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also co-authors of the narratives and causalities produced. In this respect, illusions originate not only 
from a non-functional relation between the individual actor and the world (Nørreklit, 2011, p. 19) but 
also as a result of a failed integration between organizational topoi that incapacitates the actors’ 
ability to engender the desired changes and generates dysfunctional consequences instead.  
As clarified above, the possibility of a distinction between reality and illusion is pragmatic insofar as it 
lies at the interplay between a proactive truth (will it work?) and a pragmatic truth (did it work?) 
(Nørreklit, 2017; Trenca, 2016). Hence, the aim of this research is to analyse the implementation of 
PBB in light of this distinction, with a focus on the integration of the four dimensions of reality in the 
development of a functioning topos and on the role played by co-authorship in it (see Fig. 1). Thus, 
this “learning theory of truth” (Nørreklit, 2017, p. 7) developed by pragmatic constructivism provides 
an epistemological base to assess the validity of PBB in an area of the Italian public sector. 
 
4. Research method 
 
The empirical evidence to support the research has been collected at the central level of government 
in Italy. This location provides new evidence due to Italy’s relatively recent attempts to introduce PBB 
(as compared to the Anglo-Saxon world). Therefore, the country is facing many of the challenges due 
to the reform and represents a suitable ground for achieving the research aim. A qualitative approach 
was adopted to achieve an in-depth understanding of the practice through a single case study (Yin, 
1994). The reliability of the research findings is achieved through the triangulation of different sources 
of data.  
First, the practice was studied through the analysis of legislative texts, reports and guidelines that set 
rules and principles of PBB, thus defining its overarching framework and supporting the general 
understanding of the Italian case. Second, we conducted a document analysis to understand the 
budgetary and performance system adopted at governmental level, including budget documents, 
“Performance Plans” and “Performance Reports”. Third, the PBB practice was interpreted through 
semi-structured and face-to-face interviews with experts at the central level of government. The key 
points of the interview guide are reported in Annex 1. The unit of analysis is represented by a 
government ministry and the experts were selected from different units to collect opinions from the 
main groups involved in PBB. These units are the independent performance unit (OIV) (Interviewee 
A), which has been established by the reform to support and monitor PBB implementation, the central 
budget unit in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which is responsible for supporting and 
monitoring the budget of the ministry (Interviewees B, C, F), and the division “Economic and financial 
management and planning” within the ministry (Interviewees D & E) (see Fig. 2). The interviewees 
were purposefully selected because of their direct involvement in the PBB process. In particular, the 
expert of OIV (Interviewee A) was in a managerial position, involving monitoring and supporting the 
production of performance information. This expert as well as the overall OIV are expected to act in 
an independent and impartial manner. Two of the experts of the central budget unit, B and C, were in 
managerial positions, and the official F was in a more operative position, i.e., in charge of monitoring, 
supporting and analysing the governmental ministry’s activities as users of the information during the 
budgeting process. The two experts of the division, D and E, were involved in the production of 
performance information, such as indicators and measures, as follows: D with managerial 
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responsibilities as the director of the division and E with operative responsibilities. The interviews 
lasted, on average, 75 minutes and were digitally recorded and transcribed.   
 
Figure 2. Interviews at the central level of government 
 
Indeed, in carrying out the research, we performed an in-depth analysis of the documents and 
interviews to identify the recurrent themes. We then categorized these recurrent themes in light of 
the pragmatic constructivist framework, which resulted in the following list of codes: factual 
possibilities, lack of co-actorship, values and communication, time and learning truth cycle (proactive 
and pragmatic truth), construct causalities, and illusion (see Table 2). The most significant quotes were 
then selected and are discussed in the following sections.  
 
Table 2. Examples of codification 
 
 
The following sections describe the initial stage of designing a PBB in the Italian context, followed by 
a discourse-based analysis of the implementation process aimed at highlighting the main constraints 
limiting the actors’ possibilities to contribute to a successful development of PBB practice.  
 
5. Performance-based budgeting in Italy: “will it work?” 
 
The widespread adoption of NPM across public administrations worldwide has influenced the 
adoption of NPM-inspired reforms in Italy, where signs of managerial reforms have appeared since 
the 1980s and have become more important over the following years as a means of filling the gap with 
the European best practices and for gaining internal legitimization (Ranalli & Giosi, 2011; Rebora et 
al., 2017). Indeed, during the 1990s, NPM principles, such as result-orientation, value for money, 
performance control and performance-related payment, played a key role in influencing the reforms 
taking place in Italy (Capano, 2003). However, the development of NPM reforms in Italy, as in other 
Latin countries, has been under-investigated (Kuhlmann, 2010; Ongaro, 2008), which is especially true 
for budgeting practices, for which most research has been conducted in Anglo-Saxon countries rather 
than in continental European countries (Anessi-Pessina, Barbera, Sicilia, & Steccolini, 2016). To 
contribute to the understanding of these reforms, it is necessary to explore how the principles and 
practices introduced by NPM can be differently operationalized in light of the distinctive approaches 
to public management determined by the historical traditions of the state and administration (Kickert, 
2005). Specifically, in Italy, the NPM changes introduced have been incorporated in the existing 
legalistic model, often creating a gap between reform adoption and implementation (Capano, 2003; 
Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Panozzo, 2000) and between what is done (i.e., the pragmatic truth of the 
reform) and what was expected to be achieved (as shown, for instance, by the spread of performance 
indicators but the limited use of performance information (Ongaro, 2009)).  
The introduction of the broad performance management system in Italy has been recently defined as 
a “serious game” (Rebora et al., 2017), indicating the numerous difficulties that central 
administrations have to cope with to implement such systems. Indeed, despite the modernization 
efforts and the attempts to adapt to international trends, a comprehensive shift towards a managerial 
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NPM- based model of administration has not occurred (Kuhlmann, 2010) and may not occur in light 
of the co-existence of different paradigms, such as the traditional public administration model and 
NPM (Liguori, Steccolini, & Rota, 2018). 
One of the most challenging practices introduced in this context is the practice of PBB. Its conception 
goes back to the early 2000s in Italy, when both budget processes and performance management 
systems were the objects of significant legislative interventions.  
The set of interventions made to introduce managerial practices were aimed at promoting values such 
as transparency and accountability in public finance decisions (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008). Specifically, 
the public budget became the object of an evolutionary process of change aimed at reinforcing the 
linkage between resources available for allocation and the needs to be satisfied (Ranalli & Giosi, 2011). 
The purpose was to extend the range of factual possibilities available to the administrators through a 
more efficient use of the resources and to guide them in constructing causalities by providing clear 
objectives and targets, supplemented by paying increasing attention to the results achieved by the 
funded government departments responsible for carrying out different tasks. In this regard, during 
the 2000s, the connection between budgetary decisions and the performance of public 
administrations was strengthened by a regulation introducing a new classification of the national 
budget expenditures into missions and programs (Law on accounting and finance no. 196/2009). 
Missions and programs were determined by the objectives they should achieve. The objectives were 
defined in terms of results, consistent with the logic of PBB (Servizio del Bilancio del Senato, 2007). 
What should be done with the resources is expected to prevail over who manages the resources 
(Pedone, 2008), although a centre of administrative responsibility was identified as a main actor in 
charge of each program to contribute to transparency and accountability. Ad-hoc documents are 
prepared by each minister to state strategic objectives in line with political priorities, select the 
indicators and targets used to monitor their achievement, and set the amount of resources allocated 
and their budgeted costs. At the end of the financial year, the financial cycle ends with the reporting 
of the corresponding results, which means that the pragmatic truth of the changes implemented is 
evaluated. At least from a technical point of view, this model can be considered pragmatic insofar as 
it tends to assess the validity of a practice in terms of the actual results of the initial plan compared to 
the initial expectations.  
In 2009, a comprehensive reform (Law no. 15/2009 and legislative decree no. 150/2009) was also 
introduced, which had the purpose of dealing with the so-called “performance management cycle”. 
This cycle was based on planning and evaluating as a continuum (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2012), relying 
on ad-hoc documents and organizational units. Indeed, in the “Performance Plan”, ministries were 
expected to set the objectives to be achieved and link them with the resources at their disposal. At 
the end of the year, the performance cycle ends with the “Performance Report”, which reports the 
results achieved, compared and contrasted with what is decided ex-ante. This cycle is controlled and 
monitored by the OIV, a performance strategic unit, independent from the ministry, which checks and 
controls with respect to legislative requirements and guidelines. Thus, this “performance 
management cycle” was designed to reflect the dialectics of the learning truth cycle described by 
pragmatic constructivism, i.e., the performance evaluation was being formulated in terms of an 
assessment of the pragmatic truth of practices.  
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The budget process and performance cycle are expected to be aligned, resulting in the realization of 
PBB through the coordination of the two cycles. 
 
6. PBB between illusions and reality: “did it work?” 
The PBB reform at the ministerial level was aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness in the 
allocation of public resources. The assumption guiding this type of reform was that an evaluation of 
the performance data would allow both the identification of opportunities for cost saving and an 
assessment of the needs of organizational units in terms of financial and human resources. This latter 
assessment was crucial for the realization of the organizational mission and the improvement of the 
overall organizational performance. In this respect, the performance data were expected to work as 
enlightening devices able to orient the allocation and use of resources in an efficient, effective and 
responsible way. The primary aim of performance data is to guide decision-making to reduce a 
potential strategy execution gap, i.e., a deviation between what should have been done and the actual 
results (Mitchell, Nielsen, Nørreklit, & Nørreklit, 2013). The extent to which this gap can be reduced 
depends on the ability of the actors to produce assumptions and expectations that are grounded in 
reality rather than in illusionary understandings of cause-effect relations (Nørreklit, 2000). The 
performance targets should be a function of the actual possibilities and capabilities of the organization 
(i.e., factually based) and should be set in line with the contextual factors that they aim to modify. 
At the beginning of the implementation process, the actors have to generate valid pro-active 
statements about the status quo and the future desired outputs (Nørreklit, Mitchell, & Nielsen, 2017). 
The generation of statements involves a problematization process in which the actors validate their 
understanding of factual possibilities in dialogue with other actors (i.e., through co-authorship; 
Nørreklit et al., 2017). Furthermore, in a virtuous cycle between budgeting and performance, a 
continuous adjustment of the formulated assumptions should be performed to depict the ability of 
the organizational units to fulfil specific tasks. When analysing the interview data, a first challenge 
noted by the actors concerns the first phase of identification of meaningful performance measures, 
i.e., what should be done. An interviewee explained as follows: 
An objective must be set, and verification of the attainment of this objective must be 
performed, so we measure it. For instance, with respect to the system of controls, we check 
how many controls we have performed in comparison with those that have been performed 
in the previous year...More than a performance indicator, it's a performance meter.... There 
is no indicator (...) What does it mean that we perform more or fewer controls? Perhaps there 
is more or less need to perform these controls. If we arrest more people, does it mean that 
there are more dishonest people around or that we have improved our ability to arrest 
criminals? (Interview with D - emphasis added). 
This inability to translate desired outcomes into meaningful performance indicators endangers the 
production of a pro-active truth. Indeed, it was not clear to the actors whether the indicator selected 
(i.e., number of people arrested) reflected a real fact (more crime?) or was a representation of their 
improved performance. Thus, the question will it work? remained unpresented because it 
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presupposes an understanding of what it means for a practice to be efficient and effective and an 
agreement over the criteria for assessing these dimensions. 
The representative quote above reveals that the actors adopt a correspondence theory of truth by 
focusing on the correspondence between existing facts and their performance rather than on the 
learning process involved in setting targets that aim to change existing realities and so produce 
successful results in the future. This approach considers the validity of a performance measure in 
terms of its ability to represent an existing reality (Nørreklit, 2017), i.e., in terms of proactive truth, 
rather than considering performance targets as drivers of changes. This static approach, grounded in 
mechanical realism (Mitchell et al., 2013), conceptualizes illusion as a lack of correspondence between 
the initial assumptions and the external reality, so failing is inevitable whenever the external context 
is a changing one (Cinquini, Campanale, Pianezzi, & Tenucci, 2017; Mitchell et al., 2013). This approach 
is exemplified in the following interviewee comment. 
In practice, we come up against the reality that ... maybe that's also why you cannot perform 
the evaluation…set the indicators…the performance evaluation…it is impossible for this 
reason...how do you do it? Everything constantly changes! (Interview with E). 
In this respect, a merit of pragmatic constructivism is its ability to address the limitation of this notion 
of reality in terms of representation by proposing a pragmatic understanding of truth (Mitchell et al., 
2013). The pragmatic question is did it work? (Nørreklit, 2017) and, in this context, the actors seem to 
be unable to answer it, not only because of a lack of understanding of what should be done but also 
because the importance of this question has not been perceived by the actors as a constitutive part 
of the reform.  
The issue clearly is not just worrying whether expenses have been incurred, whether they 
were legitimate or not, but evaluating the effects is also crucial [...] it is also crucial to see what 
you have done about it? We have been deficient in this (Interview with B).  
Similarly, the interviewee argued that: 
The administrations have partial information; this is the problem. I can tell you how many 
resources we have made available for a certain mission, a certain program, a certain budget 
chapter and also how many of these resources have been spent, but if you ask me how they 
have been spent, what has been produced, I will not know it (Interview with B). 
This quote is of particular importance because it reveals an attempt of the actors to contribute to the 
definition of valid criteria to assess the pragmatic truth of their practice. According to the actors, the 
illusionary character of the performance system implemented can be overcome only with a focus on 
the outcomes of the activities performed, i.e., in terms of effectiveness. Ironically, one of the main 
final objectives of the reform (i.e., to link resources to outcomes) is perceived by the actors as the 
missing point in its implementation. But, why has this been the case? The above quotes show the 
confusion of the actors with respect to the aim of the reform and of the implementation of 
performance measurement systems in general. This confusion is exemplified in another interviewee 
comment as follows: 
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The legislator has assigned to CIVIT (a national authority) the responsibility of building a 
linguistic and cultural ‘koinè’ in order to give an enriched meaning to the term performance. 
(…) The analysis of the legislative texts does not specify what performance means (Interview 
with A). 
It is unclear to the interviewees whether the reform conceptualizes performance in terms of 
productivity of organizational units, or in relation to the capacity of public interventions to produce 
the desired outcomes. The actors do not understand the finality of PBB and the values it promotes. 
The benefits that a successful implementation of the reform can produce both in terms of public 
impact of the political agenda and efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus are neither evident nor 
hoped for by the administrators. Indeed, rather than actively work for an implementation and 
amelioration of the performance measurement system, the actors produce illusions to cheat the 
system. Examples are offered by the following quotes:   
Is it possible that all the resources allocated to a ministry are associated with only 30 
objectives? It is impossible … (Interview with A). 
There are data that are produced and reported, but they are not interesting for the users. 
Honestly, I think that nobody is interested in the fact that a certain number of reports have 
been produced after taking part at some meetings (Interview with A). 
These statements reveal that the identification of objectives and the definition of performance 
indicators/measures are often driven by intentions of compliance, rather than by the willingness to 
generate construct causalities and provide support to decision-making for budgeting and resource 
allocation. Thus, the difficulties in implementing a successful learning process are inherently 
connected to a lack of integration of communication and values between the promoters of the reform 
and the administration in charge of implementing it. 
The interviewee also denounced a lack of co-authorship, which is a perception of standing outside the 
decision-making process (Baldvinsdottir & Heidarson, 2017). The lack of co-authorship results in an 
understanding of PBB as something imposed from above rather than the result of an orchestrated 
authorship. As a result, the requirements of the reform in terms of performance reporting are 
perceived by many administrators as a “useless bureaucratic obligation” (interview with A).  
The actors explained that they adopt a deductive approach when constructing causalities, meaning 
that they start by considering the mission assigned to the organizational units and then translate it 
into a set of measurable objectives (Interview with C). This deductive model leads from general 
prescriptive formulas to performance indicators (see Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. A deductive approach 
This model follows a cybernetic approach, which takes for granted that the management has correctly 
formulated the strategy and that the organization’s objectives are coherent with it (Nørreklit et al., 
2017). In contrast, a pragmatic constructivist approach requires the strategy to be “concerned with 
developing an overarching integrated topos that is able to create coherence by bridging the 
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specialized topoi of the co-operating units” (Mitchell et al., 2013, p. 17). Thus, the design should have 
resulted from a collective endeavour and bottom-up approach, which, by bringing together the 
heterogeneous resources and views of the organizational units, could have reduced the gap between 
expectations and practice. 
However, in the public sector, political priorities function as strategic guidelines that define the 
normative aspirations of the organization. In this context, any attempt to construct an overarching 
integrated topos is jeopardized because of a double mismatch. A first mismatch concerns the finalities 
of the performance system (i.e., the organizational strategy) compared with the personal aspirations 
of politicians to be re-elected in the next political elections. 
The problem is that the temporal horizon in which our political class operates is so short that 
it does not incentivize any kind of effort by politicians because, if everything goes well, these 
things will give visibility after three years (Interview with B).  
Thus, the performance data become a political rather than a managerial device (Cinquini et al., 2017). 
A second mismatch occurs between the political timing and the administration timing, as 
demonstrated by the following quote:  
If, at the end of the year, the lawmaker decides to cut budget resources further through the 
Stability Law, the plan that I have made in September of the previous year for the following 
year is completely changed (Interview with D). 
The peculiarity of the public sector in terms of complexity of decision-making makes the process of 
constructing causalities for successful practices more difficult, and the need for an integration 
between multiple organizational topoi becomes more compelling. Indeed, in the public sector, a top-
down and mechanical approach to strategy results from the nature of decision-making being limited 
by the role of legislation and the need to meet public accountability requirements, which was 
emphasized by the following quote of an interviewee, arguing that the lack of co-authorship is a 
structural characteristic of decision-making in the public sector:  
Unlike the budgets of a company that decides with a different degree of rapidity how to use 
the resources, the state budget is the result of a parliamentary authorization, meaning that 
the resources are allocated within the budget chapters in accordance with a set of norms 
approved by Parliament. This means that until there is a more structural reform, not of the 
budget, but of the governing instruments of our country, the ministries cannot divert 
resources that are destined for a certain purpose and use them for another purpose without 
having permission from Parliament itself or at least without this change being accepted by the 
control boards. This means that the instrument for implementing these changes is the decree 
of the Minister of Economy and Finance and that the decree must be registered by the Court 
of Auditors (Interview with B). 
At the same time, this limited discretionary power lying in the hands of the administration can often 
be subjected to external pressures and influences that hamper implementation efforts. This aspect 
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has been noted by an interviewee, underlining a potential risk stemming from actors’ involvement in 
the following quote: 
In Italy, there is the principle that if I involve you since the beginning, you will try to do your 
best to make the process of change difficult, activating interest groups, lobbies, and so on, 
who will protest against a resource cut, eliminating any possibilities to intervene (Interview 
with B). 
This quote shows the failure which existed in communicating values and creating the needed 
motivation and support to translate PBB into practice. Similarly, the cycle between budgeting and 
performance is not perceived in terms of a virtuous mechanism aimed at stimulating the willingness 
of the administration to do better and achieve the “best” with the resources available. Neither is it 
perceived as an incentive mechanism, aimed at producing a healthy competition between the 
different organizational units. In the eyes of the actors, PBB is a punitive control device aimed at 
limiting the administrations possibilities for action. 
I can personally say that, perhaps, the government needs to grow in terms of planning. In the 
sense that, from the point of view of public facilities, this requirement is seen as an 
administrative burden because it is required by law. There are no motivations in terms of 
rewards or sanctions in the event of failure to achieve the results, and consequently, there is 
no incentive to properly define the objective and its whole chain (Interview with B). 
Pragmatic constructivism argues that “constructing reality is that the actor is able to distinguish 
between what is factually possible and what is not” (Jakobsen, 2017, p. 141). The construction of 
causalities aimed at the implementation of successful practices requires an integration between 
values, facts, possibilities and communication. An important limitation depicted by the interviewees 
was the lack of consideration of the range of factual possibilities that the public administration has at 
its disposal. The administration is expected to make a great effort in terms of planning and definition 
of measurable objectives, but this effort is detached from existing factual possibilities insofar as it does 
not take into consideration the economic and human resources available (interview with E). The 
illusion, this time, results from a lack of correspondence between the design of the reform and the 
necessary conditions for its successful implementation. This gap between what the actors are 
expected to do and what the actors are able to do limits the utility of the performance data for decision 
making and produces a sense of frustration in the administrators. The latter feel that they are passive 
recipients of a reality that they are not able to control, rather than actors, i.e., having influence on the 
source of their own intentions and activities (Nørreklit, L., 2017), as demonstrated in the following 
quote from an interviewee: 
For example, we can use the intervention time from the call to intervention as a parameter to 
evaluate performance. That is an objective fact; let's say that because the situation is always 
an emergency, it is always the same. This year, we were more slow in intervening; why? 
Because the means of transport were broken. ... It does not depend on us (Interview with E). 
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The deployment of a learning process moving from a proactive truth (will it work?) to a pragmatic 
truth (did it work?) is also invalidated by a lack of coherence between a) the multiple topoi internal to 
the organization (each Ministry with its own characteristics and needs) and b) between the overall 
organizational topos and the external environment. The potential of the performance data, in terms 
of resource allocation, cannot be attained unless this coherence is maintained and incrementally 
improved in the long term. What the interview analyses show is that, on the contrary, the 
implementation of the reform is the result of an illusionary understanding of factual possibilities and, 
consequently, it has produced a misalignment among the administrators and between the 
organizational actors and the promoters of the reform with respect to the values and finalities 
underpinning PBB. An interviewee explained in the following quote: 
All is interpreted in the logic of the evaluation, and people, unfortunately, do not like the 
evaluation. The evaluation is not intended to bring a positive message of developing healthy 
competitiveness between the various units that make up the administration (Interview with 
A). 
In this setting, the questions will it work (proactive truth) and did it work (pragmatic truth) cannot lead 
to a virtuous learning process insofar as the word ‘it’ is the result of “illusionary language games” 
(Kure, Nørreklit, & Raffnsøe-Møller, 2017). This is a void notion to which all the different actors 
(politicians, legislators, and administrators) apply different and even conflictual meanings (e.g., does 
it refer to the impact of public policies? Does it refer to the competencies acquired by the 
administrators? Does it refer to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of internal and operational 
processes?). For a practice to be successful, the “actors need to agree on a specific set of exemplary 
references that establish a shared horizon of understanding and thereby add meaning to the concept” 
(Kure et al., 2017, p. 218). 
7. Key findings  
 
This paper aimed to provide valuable insights into the challenges faced in implementing PBB in the 
context of an Italian ministry. The analysis of the case unveiled the illusionary character of the reform 
both in terms of design (i.e., proactive truth) and implementation (i.e., pragmatic truth). The main 
limitations of the reform related to a lack of communication about the aims and objectives of PBB, a 
lack of factual possibilities for policy implementation (e. g., lack of resources, independency of bodies, 
etc.), and a lack of co-authorship in the implementation process. 
 
To begin with, there were difficulties in communicating the goals and objectives of the new practice. 
The concept of “performance” itself changed among the actors, and it was at times missing or unclear. 
Thus, “illusionary language games” occurred (Kure et al., 2017) and people were inclined to 
understand “performance” by their own definition and use.  
Second, there was a misalignment of the topos of the various organizational actors, i.e., politicians 
and public managers pursued their own values (Cinquini et al., 2017). The separability designed by the 
law between the role of “politics” (setting the goals) and “public administration” (implementing 
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decisions and actions to reach the goals) did not fit with the public sector reality and, therefore, 
represented a fictitious (nonfactual) possibility.  
Furthermore, the problem of defining and measuring the outcomes of “public policies” and the need 
for a cultural and organizational change in the public sector were underestimated. The performance 
measurement was implemented in a top-down mechanical way due to public accountability 
requirements that assign an overarching role to the law in defining the use of resources. This model 
did not consider the need for a “grounded” approach in the reality and work world of the performing 
units (Nørreklit et al., 2007). Thus, it resulted in a lack of reflexivity and co-authorship of the system, 
both in the design and the implementation phases. The virtuous circle between proactive truth, real 
truth and pragmatic learning could not work in these circumstances (Nørreklit et al., 2007; Nørreklit, 
L., 2017).  
The truth gap between pro-active information (expectations) and pragmatic information (actual 
outcomes) was impossible to evaluate, given the lack of proper information. The pragmatic truth could 
not be determined, given the uncertainty in the dimensions of facts, factual possibilities, values (goals) 
and communication (as illustrated above). The system failed to provide the “knowledge about the 
structure of integration forming construct causality in the set of activities” (Nørreklit et al., 2017, p. 
100). Thus, the reflective learning perspective, where the pro-active perspective meets the pragmatic 
perspective based on PBB, was not activated. 
In summary, the lack of integration between the reality dimensions of the actors and between the 
topos of administrators and the topos virtually embedded in the NPM reform via PBB, coupled with a 
lack of reflexivity and co-authorship in the formulation of the reform activities, produced illusions in 
two respects. First, both the overall understanding of what is expected and what should be done had 
an illusionary character since they were not grounded in valid assumptions about factual possibilities 
(i.e., what the actors are able to do). Hence, the difficulties did not lie exclusively in the selection of 
the measures to evaluate performance, but in the overall conceptual apparatus. A second dimension 
of illusion concerned the attempt by the administrators to game the system by building a deceptive 
apparatus behind a theatre of compliance and due-process. In this way, the link between performance 
data and budgetary decisions became misleading and far from being virtuous, therefore threatening 
the initial expectations of the reform.  
In consequence, PBB ended up being an “illusion” that hinders the agency of individuals rather than a 
practice for creating and fostering successful organizational development. 
8. Conclusions 
 
Although many of the problems discussed in light of the broad set of NPM reforms would have existed 
even in the absence of such reforms, NPM exacerbated the situation by acting as the “handmaiden” 
of the changes (Barberis, 1998). Previous studies have paved the way to an understanding of NPM 
reforms’ failures as a result of a combination of different factors. Contributing to this literature, this 
study argued that the state-of-the-art process needs to be explained by taking into account both 
macro and micro conditions. Therefore, in accordance with the pragmatic constructivist approach, our 
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analysis focused on the NPM reform’s distinctive traits, the public sector’s key features and the role 
of organizational actors. The empirical analysis carried out through the lens of pragmatic 
constructivism exposed the limits of NPM by pointing out the inconsistencies of PBB, which challenge 
and impede the validity of this private-inspired reform in the public sector.  
This research contributes to the literature on PBB by expanding the understanding of the conditions 
under which the validity of PBB can be realized through the uses of the dichotomy between reality 
and illusion. In particular, the challenges perceived by the actors implementing PBB have been 
identified and analysed using the pragmatic constructivism framework. The research, thus, also 
contributes to the broader debate on the effectiveness of NPM by providing empirical evidence on 
the limitations that make private-inspired reforms dysfunctional for the public sector. Finally, the 
research enriches the literature on pragmatic constructivism and extends the theory itself by offering 
an interpretative model (see Fig. 1) that combines the epistemological fundamentals of pragmatic 
constructivism (i.e., the learning truth cycle; Nørreklit, 2017) with the pragmatic constructivist 
theorization of actor-reality construction (i.e., the integration of the four dimensions of reality; 
Nørreklit et al., 2006). This model was crucial not only in the collection and interpretation of data but 
also in gaining a normative understanding of the conditions for successful practices in the specific 
context of PBB implementation. Nevertheless, these conditions and their practical implications in the 
context of the public sector require further research and the normative guidance about how public 
actors can make a managerial practice successful calls for larger comparative empirical studies.  
We acknowledge that our research may have some limitations. The investigation of PBB in a single 
organization may limit the representativeness of the scenario at the central level of government. With 
specific reference to the actors interviewed, due to their direct involvement in the budgeting and 
performance cycles, their responses may sometimes be biased in the attempt to represent a better 
scenario. However, in light of the information collected, we may state that the interviewees have been 
quite open in addressing criticalities and challenges. However, further data collection would be 
needed to replicate and expand the analysis by carrying out additional interviews with different actors, 
analysing and comparing multiple organizations and assessing, longitudinally, the validity of the 
reform. Nevertheless, the current research has been built on an in-depth and rich analysis of PBB 
implementation in one ministry by relying on a triangulation of data sources purposefully identified 
and selected. The single case study has been used as the research method whereby pragmatic 
constructivism has been adopted to explain and interpret the managerial practice of PBB.  
Further research can contribute to this debate by adopting the pragmatic constructivism to shed light 
on who can play a distinctive role over time to create the successful conditions for building valid 
practices. Furthermore, future research can deepen the analysis regarding the identification of the 
impacts of a valid managerial practice in the public sector.  
Annex – Semi- structured interview guide 
Key points discussed with the interviewees: 
• Opinions on the state-of-the-art processes 
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• Reasons for the recent reform  
• Mechanisms of the reform (budget process and performance cycle) 
• Types of information (objectives, indicators, measures, …) produced and used  
• Definition and interpretation of performance according to the interviewee/administration 
• Difficulties linked to the reform 
• Strengths and weaknesses of the reform 
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